Bruce Schneier has been writing clearly and eloquently about why the security measures imposed post 9/11 aren't really making us more secure. He also addresses the fact that some of the measures like the no-fly list and proposed national ID cards and biometrics may actually make us less secure.
His argument about the no-fly list is that it produces so many false positives that real positives will get lost in the noise in the system. Two recent events seem to back that up. First there's the incident with Cat Stevens a.k.a. Yusuf Islam back in September. He was on a watch list, yet he made it on a plane and all the way across the Atlantic before anything was done. Second, there is the more recent incident on an Air France flight which was diverted when two passengers were discovered to be on the no-fly list. So Ted Kennedy can't board a plane, but two people who are actually on the no-fly list can.
Security is important. But there has to be a better way to address this than ID cards and no-fly lists. Better screening technology at airports so weapons and bombs don't get on planes for one. And I don't mean TSA employees (T&A employees?) copping a feel.
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